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Financialising the State: Recent developments in fiscal 
and monetary policy 
 
Abstract 
Understanding the nature of state financialisation is crucial to ensure de-
financialisation efforts are successful. This paper provides a structured 
overview of the emerging literature on financialisation and the state. We 
define financialisation of the state broadly as the changed relationship 
between the state, understood as sovereign with duties and accountable 
towards its citizens, and financial markets and practices, in ways that can 
diminish those duties and reduce accountability. We then argue that there are 
four ways in which financialisation works in and through public institutions and 
policies: adoption of financial motives, advancing financial innovation, 
embracing financial accumulation strategies, and directly financialising the 
lives of citizens. Organising our review around the two main policy fields of 
fiscal and monetary policy, four definitions of financialisation in the context of 
public policy and institutions emerge. When dealing with public expenditure on 
social provisions financialisation most often refers to the transformation of 
public services into the basis for actively traded financial assets. In the context 
of public revenue, financialisation describes the process of creating and 
deepening secondary markets for public debt, with the state turning into a 
financial market player. Finally, in the realm of monetary policy financial 
deregulation is perceived to have paved the way for financialisation, while 
inflation targeting and the encouragement, or outright pursuit, of market-based 
short-term liquidity management among financial institutions constitute 
financialised policies.   
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Introduction 
The financialisation of the state and its institutions is rarely discussed but widely 
assumed in the literature. After all, it is close to impossible to imagine a shift towards 
a finance-led accumulation regime without a change in policy and behaviour of public 
institutions reflecting this increased importance of “the role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions” (Epstein 2005: 3). 
Researchers in the field have lamented the relative absence of work on state 
financialisation (Aalbers 2017, van der Zwan 2014, Stockhammer 2012). Therefore, 
we address this contradiction, providing a structured overview of the emerging 
literature on financialisation and the state.  
We argue that there are four ways in which financialisation works in and 
through public institutions and policies: adoption of financial motives, advancing 
financial innovation (i.e. the promotion and creation of new financial instruments and 
markets), embracing financial accumulation strategies, and directly financialising the 
lives of citizens.  
We define financialisation of the state broadly as the changed relationship 
between the state, understood as sovereign with duties and accountable towards its 
citizens, and financial markets and practices, in ways that can diminish those duties 
and reduce accountability. But financialisation takes on specific shapes in the two 
main policy fields of fiscal and monetary policy. Three definitions of financialisation 
emerge: When dealing with public expenditure on social provisions financialisation 
most often refers to the transformation of public services into the basis for actively 
traded financial assets. In the context of public revenue, financialisation describes 
the process of creating and deepening secondary markets for public debt, with the 
state turning into a financial market player, seeking returns from financial assets. 
Finally, in the realm of monetary policy financial deregulation is perceived to have 
paved the way for financialisation, while inflation targeting and the encouragement or 
(as in the case of the European Central Bank, ECB) outright pursuit of market-based 
short-term liquidity management among financial institutions constitute financialised 
policies.   
Our structured review fulfils three essential functions: First, there as yet is no 
comprehensive review of the contemporary literature on the topic. Several 
categorisations of the general phenomenon have been put forward in the literature 
(van der Zwan 2014; Karwowski, Shabani and Stockhammer 2016; Aalbers 2017), 
but state financialisation is never a principle concern. Second, to outline possible 
avenues for de-financialisation it is crucial to understand the how and why of state 
financialisation. Much of the work we discuss here asks about the motives of the 
state and specific agents of change among public institutions, highlighting the 
heterogeneity of public entities, which is too often neglected in economists’ work. 
Finally, we fill an important analytical gap by integrating different strands of research 
that – often unknowingly – complement each other. For example, the financialisation 
of sovereign debt management, especially the shift towards a consolidation state 
(Streeck 2013) and fiscal austerity, induces the financialisation of welfare provision. 
Observing these two phenomena in isolation, e.g. taking tighter local budgets for 
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granted, can result in the belief that financialisation of social provision is a welcome 
opportunity for cash-stripped communities (see Torrance 2009). Thus, our review 
connects separate research agendas with the aim of a more comprehensive and 
critical understanding of state financialisation, which in turn helps outline fields for 
future research. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents the conceptual 
framework providing the structure for our review. Broadly speaking, we distinguish 
between the financialisation of fiscal policy and monetary policy. Therefore, sections 
3 and 4 deal with the two main dimensions of public finances, i.e. public spending 
and public revenue. Subsequently, we turn to the financialisation of monetary policy 
in section 5. We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of our findings 
for de-financialisation efforts going forward.    
 
Conceptualising the Role of the State in Financialisation 
The concept of financialisation has gained increasing popularity across the social 
sciences since the term was coined in the early 1990s. The most widely used 
definition is probably Epstein’s description of financialisation as “the increasing role 
of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operations of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005: 3). This 
broad understanding of financialisation has been criticised by some for a lack of 
focus (Christophers 2015, Michell and Toporowski 2014), while others hailed its 
ability to generate an interdisciplinary research agenda (Aalbers 2015).  
As result, there have been various attempts to categorise financialisation 
research, providing structured overviews and “making sense of financialisation” (van 
der Zwan 2014: 99). Three research strands can be distinguished within the 
financialisation literature: (1) approaches addressing shifts in accumulation regimes, 
(2) approaches based on shareholder value and (3) approaches focusing on the 
financialisation of everyday life (see e.g. Krippner 2005, Aalbers 2008, French, 
Leyshon and Wainwright 2011, van der Zwan 2014).  
Change towards a finance-led accumulation regime is difficult, if not 
impossible, to imagine without some form of financialisation of the state. 
Nevertheless, a recently published overview article points out that ‘[r]esearch on the 
financialization of public and semi-public institutions is still in its infancy’ (Aalbers 
2017: 13). This contradiction is also picked up by van der Zwan (2014) when she 
argues that in Marxist analysis the role of the state often remains passive because 
financialisation is understood as an inevitable result of mature capitalism (see also 
Krippner 2011). Similarly, in Post Keynesian literature the rentier, i.e. a financial elite 
pushing for financialisation, is responsible for declining investment rates 
(Stockhammer 2004, Orhangazi 2008), low wages and employment (Stockhammer 
and Onaran 2013) and rising inequality (Kus 2012), with the state, at least implicitly, 
looking on helplessly. Aalbers (2017) argues that the influence of these powerful 
elites on state institutions and policies underpinning financialisation are often 
assumed but not analytically demonstrated. 
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Particularly among heterodox economists the financialisation of the state 
appears an afterthought. It is sometimes presumed to be part of the shift towards a 
finance-led accumulation regime through the adoption of neoliberal policies. For 
instance, van Treeck (2009) distinguishes between firm-level (micro) and more 
systemic (macro) financialisation research. There appears to be the assumption that 
public institutions and policy must also be undergoing a financialisation process, 
since the retrenchment of welfare provision stemming from neoliberal policies - a 
narrow understanding of state financialisation - is included in the discussion. 
Sectoral (macro) analysis of financialisation has found greater favour among 
heterodox economists. A macroeconomic perspective implies the analysis of sectoral 
aggregates, i.e. non-financial companies, households, the financial sector, the state 
and the foreign sector. Strikingly, the public sector is typically omitted. For example, 
providing one of the few early comparative accounts of financialisation, Lapavitsas 
and Powell (2013) analyse the phenomenon in the US, UK, Germany, France and 
Japan, considering the financial sector, non-financial companies and households in 
detail. Neither the foreign sector nor the state figure in the discussion. Providing an 
account of the 2008 crisis through the lens of financialisation, Stockhammer (2013) 
focuses on the same countries and macroeconomic aggregates, but introduces 
capital inflows to incorporate an open economy perspective. The public sector is 
absent from the analysis by Stockhammer (2013: 49) who admits that ‘changes in 
the state get insufficient attention’ in the financialisation literature. A comparative 
study of European countries by Brown, Passarella and Spencer (2016) argues that 
financialisation is variegated across the continent. The study focuses on the financial 
and household sectors, again leaving out the public sector. These omissions are also 
common in studies of emerging economies. For instance, Ashman, Mohamed and 
Newman (2013) and Newman (2015) carry out sectoral analyses to assess South 
Africa’s financialisation – once again omitting the public sector.  
This paper provides a structured overview of the nascent research area of 
financialisation and the state, and argues for a greater research focus on changes 
within the state. For this purpose, we have reviewed works across different 
disciplines which address the financialisation of the state. We focus on the main 
functions carried out by state entities: public finance and monetary policy. Since the 
2008 crisis, aspects of financial stability, especially financial regulation, are regarded 
as an integral part of the latter (IMF 2015). Public finances (or fiscal policy) address 
the balance between state expenditure, mainly social provision, and public income 
sources. The financialisation of monetary policy on the other hand refers to the 
institutions and policies representing the monetary policy framework (typically with 
inflation targeting at its heart) and regulating financial markets to maintain financial 
stability. 
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Table 1. Categorising the Financialisation of the State 
FISCAL POLICY MONETARY POLICY 
Social Provision 
 Pensions 
 Health 
 Education 
 Physical infrastructure 
Public Revenue  
 Sovereign debt management  
 Tax revenue 
 Sovereign wealth funds 
Financial Regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
Monetary Policy Framework 
 Inflation targeting 
 
 
 
 
 
We find that there are four main ways how financialisation works in and 
through public institutions and policies: First, there has undoubtedly been an 
adoption of financial motives among public institutions. Second, state entities have 
engaged in financial innovation, promoting and creating investment instruments and 
new financial markets. Third, governments have engaged in financial accumulation, 
becoming active market participants that behave increasingly like private firms. 
Finally, state institutions and policies have directly and indirectly contributed to the 
financialisation of the lives of their citizens. The question why state institutions have 
followed financialised policies is more difficult to tackle, and a full answer requires 
further research. Financialisation is arguably an opportunity for state entities. Two 
main hypotheses emerge from the literature. It is either an opportunity to surmount 
budgetary constraints (Trampusch 2017, Strickland 2013, Torrance 2009, Datz 2008) 
or to push factional interests against established institutions or elites (Trampusch 
2017, Davis and Walsh 2016, Lagna 2016). Research here stresses the 
heterogeneity of state interests among public institutions and their agency in driving 
the financialisation process. Nevertheless, once financialised motives and tools are 
taken on board they shape policy and public institutions, leading to regulation which 
structurally further entrenches financialisation (Preunkert 2017), sometimes even 
against the interests of the public representatives that advocated them in the first 
place (Pacewicz 2013). 
 
Fiscal Policy: Social Provision 
The financialisation of social provision and the welfare state, especially physical and 
social infrastructure, has received considerable attention from academics and civil 
society. The latter (Aitken 2015, Bretton Woods Project 2010, Caliari 2016, Hildyard 
2012, ODG 2015, Whitfield 2012, World Rainforest Movement 2014) is a result of the 
prevailing understanding that infrastructure is a public good to be provided by the 
state. Public works programmes and Keynesian policies have shaped this perception 
(O’Neill 2013). However, since the 1980s governments have increasingly privatised 
social provision, a central element of the neoliberal policy agenda (Fine 2009, 2010). 
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Privatisation has been criticised for jeopardising access to fairly-priced and high-
quality infrastructure for all (Mendoza 2016). Neoliberalism, with its focus on creating 
markets, facilitates the emergence of financialisation (Fine 2009). But there is a 
danger of portraying financialisation merely as a continuation of privatisation or 
neoliberalism (March and Purcell 2014).  
Some researchers (Aitken 2015, Lis 2015, Teles 2015, Caliari 2016, 
Mendoza 2016, Seddon and Currie 2016) draw only vague distinctions between 
financialisation and the implementation of neoliberal policies, especially privatisation. 
This is misleading, since the emergence of financialisation is neither an automatic 
consequence of neoliberal policies, nor is neoliberalism necessarily a precondition 
for the emergence of financialisation, as exemplified by the changing ownership 
structures within Chinese state-owned enterprises (Wang 2015). By not clearly 
distinguishing between the two phenomena critiques that financialisation is an 
unclear and confused concept are validated.  
In the following, we review the four ways of state financialisation with regard 
to social and physical infrastructure. We distinguish the two infrastructure types as is 
conventional practice (Inderst 2010, OECD 2014). We begin with pension provision, 
a part of social infrastructure singled out due to the importance of institutional 
investors in the financialisation process. 
 
Pension provision 
Changes in pension schemes have been identified as a driving force behind 
financialisation (Clark 2000, Toporowski 2000), but it was not so much the 
emergence of private pension funds as the shift from unfunded pay-as-you-go 
schemes to (partly) funded schemes that was crucial (Engelen 2003). Funded 
pensions become large pools of retirement savings (Dixon and Sorsa 2009), 
demanding profitable and ideally liquid financial instruments in their search for yield 
(Toporowski 2000).  
Proponents of funded pensions (World Bank 1994, OECD 1995, 1996, 1998, 
European Commission 2000) claim that they provide a more prudent alternative to 
unfunded pay-as-you-go arrangements, deepen financial markets, nurture financial 
innovation, reduce risk and boost growth. Critics warn that macroeconomically they 
foster financialisation (Engelen 2003), spreading systemic risk (Bonizzi and Churchill 
2016) and undermining productive investment in the long-run (Toporowski 2000). 
The large and growing demand for assets by institutional investors causes asset 
price inflation. In the US, the ‘coming of age’ of many large pension funds during the 
1970s induced a search for profitable investments in the 1990s, which fed the 
dotcom bubble (Toporowski 2000, Engelen 2003). Since many pension funds are 
currently in their maturity period they are unlikely to be committed holders of long-
term productive investment (Engelen 2002). This might explain why – despite a shift 
away from equity after the last financial crisis – institutional investors have 
channelled a rather small share of their funds into infrastructure investment (1% 
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globally, Della Croce and Gatti 2014), favouring private equity and hedge funds 
which are likely to fuel the shadow banking sector (Bonizzi and Churchill 2016). 
From a microeconomic perspective, funded pensions bring about the 
financialisation of citizens’ everyday life (Langley 2002, Weiss 2015). They introduce 
the idea that employees should be individually responsible for their retirement, 
turning pension contribution into deferred consumption (Berry 2014). This narrative – 
generally prevalent in the debate about welfare privatisation (see Mulligan 2015 for 
healthcare) – discards the notion that pensions should be collectively provided by 
society for those unable to work because of age, disability or else. Financialisation 
introduces insecurity into people’s lives, which leads to resistance. The limited initial 
uptake of funded pensions in the UK (Berry 2014) is arguably a manifestation of such 
resistance (see Weiss 2015 for Israel), making the success of financialisation 
crucially dependent on the state (Biondi and Sierra 2017, McCarthy 2014). In the UK, 
automatic enrolment into funded private pensions was introduced after voluntary 
uptake was limited (Berry 2014). Regulatory change across OECD countries aiming 
at more prudent valuations of pension funds’ assets and liabilities after the last 
financial crisis resulted in the inflation of liabilities. This forces pension funds to seek 
more high-yielding, i.e. more speculative, assets to avoid being classified as 
underfunded (Bonizzi and Churchill 2016).  
There is a general perception that states yield to financial sector lobbying, 
introducing regulation that favours funded, and privately provided, pension schemes 
(Klein 2003, Leimgruber 2008, Meyer and Bridgen 2012; Naczyk 2013). Using the 
example of New Zealand, Trampusch (2017) argues that states – in fact, specific 
state institutions such as the Treasury – pursue their own economic and financial 
motives, such as budget balancing and financial deepening, rather than responding 
to private sector pressure when pushing for financialisation. Thus, more research into 
the specific motives of governments to follow financialised policies and the exact 
agents of change is necessary. 
 
Social Infrastructure 
Leaving pension provision aside, the financialisation of social infrastructure is a 
vastly under-researched phenomenon. Private health insurers, as in the US for 
instance, bear all the characteristics of funded pension funds since they pool their 
customers’ savings for future health expenditure. They therefore also contribute 
towards the inflation of financial assets (Wray 2009). They engage in financial 
innovation, engineering new financial instruments, such as high deductible plans and 
health savings accounts (Mulligan 2015). Private health clinics, alongside 
universities, have been observed to adopt financialised practices. Hospital 
corporations for example have been documented to actively engage in mergers and 
acquisitions, list on the stock exchange and seek financial assets in emerging – and 
therefore presumably highly profitable – markets such as Turkey (Vural 2016) and 
Brazil (Bahia 2016).  
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Research on financialisation of education is almost entirely limited to higher 
education and the US. US universities have become involved in financial markets. 
The richest (top 1%) colleges have used the financial markets to generate significant 
revenue for operations since the 1990s. Simultaneously, US universities across the 
board raised their debt burdens (Eaton et al. 2016), while purchasing complex 
instruments such as interest rate swaps (Russel, Sloan and Smith 2016). The latter 
were speculative, turning into losses once the financial crisis hit. Russel, Sloan and 
Smith (2016) identify conflicts of interest among university board members, often 
themselves part of the finance elite, as an important reason for such speculative 
investment.  
Student debt in the US has received much attention in this respect 
(McClanahan 2011a, 2011b). In this Anglo-Saxon market, the state has fostered the 
growth of the student loan market. Already in the 1970s student debt became the 
only form of consumer debt that is government insured, while individuals are 
prohibited from walking away from it in bankruptcy (Adamson 2009). Since 2010, as 
private lending to students collapsed due to regulatory changes, the federal 
government became the main creditor, issuing 90% of all new loans (Eaton et al. 
2016), thus directly contributing to the financialisation of students’ lives. 
In the Netherlands, another well-documented case of university 
financialisation, the phenomenon is driven by real estate. The trigger was the 
government’s decision to transfer ownership of public real estate to public service 
providers, i.e. hospitals, schools and universities, to pre-empt future budget burdens 
(Engelen, Fernandez and Hendrikse 2014). Universities and other public and 
parastatal entities, struggling with the upkeep and renovation costs, are now being 
forced to run up debt, sometimes combining it with speculative investments in 
interest rate swaps (Engelen 2015) and derivatives (Aalbers, van Loon and 
Fernandez 2015).  
Health and education companies have become attractive to financial 
investors. In the US, the number of proprietary and for-profit colleges either listing on 
the stock exchange or owned by private equity firms has surged since the early 
2000s (Eaton et al. 2016). Similarly, international financial investors have 
increasingly acquired stakes in hospital providers in emerging economies since the 
2000s (e.g. Bahia et al. 2016, Vural 2016). Thus, health and education providers 
have become financial assets. As discussed in the next section, the same is true for 
physical infrastructure. 
 
Physical Infrastructure 
Without financialised investment arrangements, privatisation of infrastructure was not 
always particularly attractive to the private sector, as for instance in the case of water 
(OECD 2009, Marin 2009, Bayliss 2014a). Traditionally, a private sponsor would 
secure long-term funds using own capital and/or a bank loan, for example. The 
project would generate revenue for the sponsor through user fees, often including a 
minimum revenue level guaranteed by the state (as part of public private partnership 
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(PPP) agreement, Whitfield 2012), but private developers and lenders would be 
exposed to the risks associated with the construction projects themselves, such as 
delays and cost overruns.  
Financialisation introduced ‘structured finance’ arrangements, allowing the 
project developers to minimise their risk. It transforms roads, bridges or water 
provision from a “physical and productive component of the urban environment into a 
financial asset defined by risk and return” (O’Brien and Pike 2015a: 14, based on 
Strickland 2013). Increasingly complex financial instruments such as derivatives 
based on loans provided for infrastructure projects can be created to generate 
financial profit, making infrastructure investment attractive to private investors 
(Hildyard 2012). Over the last decade infrastructure funds have become 
commonplace (Bayliss 2014a, Hildyard 2012). This means that project developers 
and financial investors can easily sell their financial assets in secondary markets, 
reducing risk while pushing up profits during times of asset price inflation (Whitfield 
2012).   
The limited profitability of public infrastructure become evidence when the 
presence of private creditors changes the nature of public provision. Social housing 
infrastructure in the UK is a prime example. Underfunded housing associations are 
pressured to adopt financial motives, embracing real estate valuations and risk 
metrics used in the private sector, to attract private capital through bond issuance. 
The presence of private investors, however, can undermine the purpose of social 
housing, i.e. providing good quality affordable housing to low-income earners and the 
unemployed, as some housing associations have started to reduce the number of 
‘risky’ tenants they accept to ensure repayment to creditors (Wainwright and 
Manville, 2017). 
Some researchers have welcomed financialised funding practices as a way to 
develop infrastructure in a more “economical manner” (Torrance 2009: 817), but 
most are deeply sceptical of infrastructure financialisation. Focusing on the 
financialisation of everyday life, Allen and Pryke (2013, backed by Loftus, March and 
Nash 2016) argue that the financialisation of household water provision turns citizens 
into human revenue streams, while simultaneously de-politicising the question of how 
vital infrastructure should be provided. With a more systemic criticism in mind, Fine 
(2009) points out that the transformation of infrastructure into financial assets creates 
instability, opening the door for financial speculation. For example, privatised and 
financialised UK water providers have seen ever-increasing debt burdens on their 
balance sheets (Bayliss 2014b). Since debt is cheaper than equity, rising debt 
burdens increase profit margins and generate funds for distribution to sharholders. 
The state is vital in this process because its implicit backing of water providers, who 
are too big to fail, allows water companies to hike up debt while holding on to stable 
credit ratings. 
 
 
 
 11 
Fiscal Policy: Public Revenue 
Tax revenue and sovereign debt issuance are the main sources of income in the 
public sector. Since the 1980s, with declining tax takes public debt burdens have 
risen in many rich countries, elevating the importance of sovereign debt management 
(SDM). Streeck (2013) describes this development as a shift from the tax state, 
which mainly finances expenditure through taxation, to the debt state, which finances 
rising expenditure demands through growing debt. The growth of financial markets 
since the 1980s, when rich country governments, while eager to support corporate 
profitability, increasingly came under pressure to fulfil rising social welfare needs, 
was an opportunity for states to address the two conflicting demands (see also 
Plihon 1996 and Krippner 2011). Hence, rising public debt burdens are a symptom of 
financialisation. Fastenrath, Schwan and Trampusch (2017) argue that the way in 
which governments raise and manage debt together with the structural composition 
of public debt have changed, reflecting this aspect of state financialisation. Thus, the 
financialisation of the state turned public debt into actively traded financial assets, 
deepening secondary markets, while the state assimilated financial motives and 
became an innovative financial market player, aiming to reduce the cost of its debt 
portfolio.   
Prior to the 1980s, governments typically had long-standing relationships with 
specific financial investors who acquired government bonds (or provided credit) with 
the intention of holding the debt to maturity (Preunkert 2017). As needs for debt 
financing became more pressing, some governments encouraged a wide range of 
financial institutions to purchase their bonds so as to reduce yield and therefore the 
cost of debt financing, while nurturing secondary markets for government bonds.  
States, thus, gave up their passive book keeping role in SDM, instead becoming 
market players and creators, while increasingly resembling private-sector investors.  
A symptom of this transformation was the shift of most OECD countries away 
from syndicate placement of bonds with a trusted group of investors towards bond 
auctions (Fastenrath et al. 2017). The importance of foreign investors also grew as 
international financial markets integrated and market-based accounting techniques, 
e.g. accrual accounting, were copied (Fastenrath et al. 2017, Preunkert 2017). 
Financial motivations were internalised by SDM institutions over time, epitomised in 
the emergence of specialised debt management offices (DMOs) (Fastenrath et al. 
2017, Preunkert 2017, Trampusch 2017). DMOs took on an active role promoting 
their national government bonds while aiming at reducing debt servicing costs 
through the use of financial instruments such as interest rate derivatives. 
The promotion of government bonds has become crucial within the Eurozone, 
where countries issue national debt in the same currency, directly competing among 
each other. European institutions – such as the ECB and the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) – undoubtedly, contributed to the financialisation of public finances in 
the Eurozone (Preunkert 2017, Trampusch 2017, Lagna 2016). However, it was not 
merely instrumentalised by transnational finance elites to push their agenda, as 
sometimes argued (Bieling 2013). Factions within member states utilised the 
(perceived) pressure of the EMU to further their domestic agendas. In Germany the 
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expected competition in bond issuance was used by the Ministry of Finance together 
with Frankfurt-based finance elites to push for a financialisation of SDM. This 
elevated their political and geographical influence, while breaking the stronghold of 
the German Bundesbank, hitherto the bookkeeper of government debt and a staunch 
opponent of innovation in SDM (Trampusch 2017). In Italy, the Maastricht criteria, 
calling for fiscal restraint, were used to weaken the political influence of right-wing 
and industrial elites who abused fiscal profligacy. Lagna (2016) argues that state 
financialisation, i.e. the adoption of financially innovative strategies to manage public 
revenue, was embraced as tool for state management.  
Other perceived threats can equally be instrumentalised to legitimise 
financialised policies. In the UK, the threat of stagflation was utilised by the Treasury 
and the Bank of England to implement policies that displaced the Department of 
Trade and Industry as the leading policy maker, shifting power purposefully away 
from industry towards finance with the claim that it would fix the failed orthodox 
Keynesian policies of the 1960s and 1970s (Davis and Walsh 2016). Thus, there is 
an increasingly broad agreement that governments have been actively pursuing 
financialisation (Trampusch 2017, Preukert 2017, Livne and Yonay 2015, Davis and 
Walsh 2016, Lagna 2016, 2015), in contrast to what “most observers have 
acknowledged” in the past (Davis and Walsh 2016: 666). 
While the expansion of debt burdens at the national level favoured the 
financialisation of public revenue, fiscal consolidation or austerity intensified this 
trend, pushing it down towards the regional and local scale. The most extreme 
manifestation of this downward pressure is tax incremental finance (TIF), which is 
extensively utilised by municipalities almost all across the US (Ashton, Doussard and 
Weber 2012, Pacewicz 2013) and by some UK cities (Strickland 2013). TIF 
effectively securitises future property tax revenue for a specific geographical area, 
i.e. the TIF district, providing safe collateral for creditors while offering a more 
favourable impact on cities’ credit ratings than direct borrowing. The securitisation of 
tax revenue (rather than public debt) gives the financialisation of public finances a 
new qualitative dimension in the US as property taxes are the main source of 
taxation in many municipalities. Thus, cities hand over their main source of future 
income to financial investors. Since the 1970s municipal budgets in the US – like in 
many other rich countries – have come under pressure as the relationship between 
cities and the state/federal level changed, reflecting neoliberal retrenchment, 
facilitating this process. Interest rate swaps are another financially innovative product 
used by municipalities to prop up their finances (see Tickell 1998 for the UK, 
Hendrikse 2015 for Germany, and Lagna 2015 for Italy).  
Some suggest that financialisation of federal and municipal finances is an 
opportunity for governments to independently generate income (Ashton et al. 2012, 
Strickland 2013), while using financialisation as a policy tool to push through specific 
interests (Lagna 2016). With a view to the global South, Datz (2008) celebrates 
financial accumulation through sovereign wealth funds SWFs), a non-traditional 
means of raising public revenue, as chance for commodity-rich emerging economies 
to generate revenue while becoming market investors. Dixon (2009), in contrast, 
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calls SWFs out for what they are: a sign of state financialisation ‘wherein policy 
makers’ “passions” to maximise power are increasingly tempered by their new 
“interests” in maximising profit’ (Dixon 2009: 303).   
There are several flaws in the arguments behind these enthusiastic calls to 
embrace state financialisation because the latter causes uneven growth, undermines 
democratic oversight and raises inequality. The ability of governments – both at the 
national or sub-national level – to utilise financial innovation to their benefit will be 
uneven (Weber 2010). While some countries, regions or cities might be able to profit 
from deeper markets for government bonds or municipal TIFs, others will be left 
behind by either losing out on speculative deals or by not being deemed attractive 
outlets for financial investment (Peck and Whiteside 2016, Halbert and Guironnet 
2014). At the country level this was visible during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
when Germany enjoyed negative yields on its bonds, while the Eurozone periphery 
faced rising costs. Emerging economies are regularly confronted with such financing 
problems. Hardie (2011) argues that encouraging the financialisation of sovereign 
debt markets undermines debt sustainability in poorer countries because of the 
structural volatility of private capital flows (see also Tyson and McKinley 2014), 
limiting countries’ capacity to take on public debt.  
A major problem of financialised public revenue is how it serves to undermine 
democratic oversight. DMOs have been set up independently from extant 
government institutions, mimicking private sector financial institutions in structure and 
pay scales (Fastenrath et al. 2017). Their portfolios and transactions are often 
neither disclosed to the public nor to democratically elected representatives (Piga 
2001). Similarly, sovereign wealth funds in many developing countries are set up as 
independent institutions, often emulating private-sector financial investment 
strategies (Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute 2012, Olawoye 2016). At the municipal 
level, budget decisions when linked to TIFs are mainly shaped by unelected financial 
professionals (Pacewicz 2013). Thus, technical complexity and financial expertise 
justify reduced democratic scrutiny where financialisation enters public revenue 
generation. 
But the democratic deficit introduced by state financialisation goes further: 
how public revenue is raised directly impacts how public expenditure is shaped and 
welfare policies are designed, most visible in the instrument of social impact bonds. 
Designed to attract private financial investors with allegedly humanitarian motivations 
(Dowling 2017), social impact bonds finance welfare provision in the UK, e.g. 
programmes tackling rough sleeping (Andreu 2016). The private investor provides 
funding upfront and is repaid with interest when a specified social service is delivered 
successfully and measurably by a private (often not-for-profit) provider. Because the 
underlying social service is designed to fit the tradable financial asset it tends to run 
for a shorter period (Andreu 2016) with often socially problematic but measurable 
aims (Dowling 2017). Thus, social impact bonds exemplify the conflict of interest that 
financialisation bestows on governments. The state acting as sovereign will have 
duties that conflict with the interest of the state acting as financial market player 
(Livne and Yonay 2015). Streeck (2013) captures this contradiction of state 
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financialisation by arguing that the demands of the people (Staatsvolk), i.e. ordinary 
citizens, for social welfare directly clash with the market people (Marktvolk), i.e. 
financial investors who ask for welfare retrenchment to ensure public debt 
repayment.   
Finally, it appears cynical to speak of opportunities when especially lower 
tiers of government are forced into financialisation through the adverse impact of 
austerity policies on their budgets (e.g. Hendrikse 2015). Austerity, or the 
consolidation state (Streeck 2013), was preceded by declining tax rates and tax 
takes since the 1970s, which required persistent budget deficits to maintain social 
provision. This shift of government revenue towards debt financing allowed for large 
wealth accumulation among the rich in OECD countries. Thus, there is evidence that 
financialisation directly contributes to income inequality since it is the wealthy who 
benefit most from investment in public bonds (Hager 2014, Whitefield and Peck 
2013).  
 
Monetary Policy 
The section is organised chronologically, interrogating decisions about monetary 
policy and financial deregulation of the 1970s-80s, 1990s-2000s and the period since 
the financial crisis as to their meaning for financialisation across the globe. The 
differences in room for manoeuvre between governments in the global South and 
those in the global North are stark. The former are even more constrained by 
financialisation in their monetary policy than in the area of public finance. 
 
The 1970s and 1980s 
The deregulation of financial markets takes a central role in financialisation theories. 
Especially approaches influenced by Marx’s thought – world systems theory (Arrighi 
1994), the monopoly capital school (Magdoff and Sweezy 1983) and the French 
regulationists (Aglietta 1990, Plihon 1996, Orléan 1999) to name a few – see the 
liberation of finance starting in the 1970s as the rich states’ answer to the socio-
economic crisis at the end of the Fordist era (Krippner 2011). On the international 
plane, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, 
underpinned by restricted international capital mobility, is understood as the catalyst 
for the advent of financialisation (Luo 2017, Orhangazi 2014, Lapavitsas 2009, Plihon 
1996). The United States’ unilateral decision to terminate its guarantee of converting 
dollars into gold in 1971 turned the dollar into a fiat currency, while effectively ending 
the international monetary and exchange rate system of the previous 25 years or so. 
Marxist authors (e.g. Luo 2017, Shaik 2016) consider this moment of abandoning 
gold as an anchor for money as the origin of financialisation, since credit extension 
could now soar, allowing for an expansion of the finance industry decoupled from 
growth in production.  
While some authors stress that loosening restrictions on cross-border capital 
flows were an inevitable reaction to facts created by US companies who had already 
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internationalised their (financial) operations (Orhangazi 2014), others see the agency 
of rich-country states as central. Confronted with slowing growth and tax revenue, 
the increased need for debt financing of public expenditure meant that opening up 
domestic capital markets for foreign investors was in the interest of countries such as 
for example the US (Krippner 2011), France (Plihon 1996) or Germany (Streeck 
2013).  
Few authors would, however, claim that states’ loosening grip on financial 
markets was a deliberate move to financialisation (see for instance Gowan 1999, 
Dumenil and Levy 2004). Rather, financialisation was an unintended consequence of 
state action, grappling with adverse macroeconomic circumstances (Luo 2017, 
Krippner 2011). This is exemplified in changes to domestic financial regulation. In the 
US, for example, hitherto established caps on depositing and lending interest rates, 
standardly used across rich and poor countries alike, were removed since retail 
banks were becoming unprofitable in a high inflation environment (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000). As deregulation went on, lobbying by the finance sector grew more 
effective the weaker trade unions became and the more left-wing parties moved 
away from their traditional electorate (Witko 2014). Thus, an important aspect of 
financialised monetary policy is the deregulation of international and domestic 
financial markets. While it paved the way for financialised monetary policy in rich 
countries, it was not instrumental in bringing about financialisation. 
The role of deregulation, i.e. especially financial liberalisation, differs when 
dealing with the global South. Here, financialisation is sometimes described as 
‘subordinated’ (Kaltenbrunner and Paincera 2017, Powell 2013, Lapavitsas 2013, 
Becker, Jäger, Leubolt and Weissenbacher 2010), i.e. shaped by financialised 
activity in core countries such as the US. Financial liberalisation, i.e. the deregulation 
in particular of financial accounts and the opening up of domestic financial markets 
for foreign investors, is frequently identified as driving force behind domestic 
symptoms of financialisation (e.g. corporate short-termism, see Rossi 2011, Demir 
2007). This gives the phenomenon a strongly external character in these economies, 
with limited agency for domestic governments who are often described as subject to 
pressure from, first, the World Bank/IMF (Lapavitsas 2009) and subsequently from 
international investors (Hardie 2011). This is hardly surprising given the aggressive 
stance the World Bank/IMF took since the 1980s, advising developing countries to 
reform their financial systems and dramatically reduce government regulation in 
order to get ‘interest rates right’ (Long 1990: 169, World Bank 1989). Nevertheless, 
there is a small number of contributions, which stresses the local embeddedness of 
financialisation in the global South, arguing that there are in fact powerful domestic 
political economy reasons for financial deregulation (see Rethel 2011 on Malaysia). 
Once restrictions on international capital mobility were lifted, high interest 
rates were introduced in the US as part of the Volcker experiment in a bid to attract 
financial inflows (Krippner 2011), while combatting inflation. Federal funds rates of 
close to 20% made financial investment more lucrative than productive enterprise, 
which constituted a financialised monetary policy. This pushed up the profitability of 
financial firms (Dumenil and Levy 2005), meaning that industrial capital lost out at the 
 16 
expense of finance due to the high interest rates of the 1970s and 1980s (see Artigis 
and Pitelis 2001 for evidence for the UK and US). For poorer countries, high interest 
rates in the ‘core’ paired with international capital mobility meant a reversal of capital 
inflows, triggering a lost decade across Latin America and Africa, where 
governments were confronted with currency and sovereign debt crises (Heintz and 
Balakrishnan 2012, see Correa, Vidal and Marshall 2012 for Mexico). 
 
The 1990s and early 2000s 
In the late 1980s, the monetary policy regime in the US underwent a fundamental 
shift towards looser policy. The ‘Greenspan put’, i.e. the expansionary policy 
embraced by the Federal Reserve in response to the 1987 stock market crash, 
heralded this shift. Increasing monetary liquidity became the standard response to 
macroeconomic slowdown in the US (Crouch 2009, Bonizzi 2017). This new policy 
stance fuelled asset price inflation, particularly in stock markets and residential 
housing, both key aspects of financialisation (Zhang and Bezemer 2014, Hudson 
2010, Toporowski 2000, Clarke 2000). Crouch (2009) argues that loose monetary 
policy was instrumental to ensure the asset-based welfare of lower and middle 
classes given the rollback of social provision in favour of (financial) market-based 
services. Thus, low interest rates in the US have fuelled asset price inflation, a major 
aspect of financialisation.    
Despite this shift towards accommodating monetary policy in the US, the 
1990s brought about the formal introduction of inflation targeting across the globe. 
While macroeconomic policies in the global North had already shifted emphasis 
away from full employment towards low inflation during the 1970s and 1980s, 
inflation targeting and central bank independence were formally only implemented 
throughout the 1990s. Epstein (2001) argues that these so-called rule-based 
monetary policies, which claim to improve growth and employment outcomes, are 
financialised. Claims about their beneficial effects on growth and employment 
outcomes are hardly backed by supportive empirical evidence, while they have been 
shown to benefit rentiers, i.e. financial investors, and reduce democratic 
accountability of monetary policy. This argument has been echoed in the context of 
the global South (e.g. Epstein and Yeldan 2008, Isaacs 2014), where inflation 
targeting has been on the rise as monetary policy framework since the late 1990s.  
Tellingly, the inflation-targeting framework does not take into account asset price 
inflation (Epstein and Yeldan 2008), a financially destabilising dynamic, but one that 
is in the interest of financial investors and arguably was deliberately fuelled by 
Greenspan in the US. Thus, during the 1990s, central banks across the globe have 
internalised the financial motives of private investors and creditors through inflation 
targeting, aimed at preserving the value of financial investments, which would be 
eroded with stronger increases in the price level.  
In the 1990s, interest rates in rich economies came down to more moderate 
levels. However, the lower-ranking position of poorer countries’ currencies in the 
international hierarchy meant increased exchange rate volatility and financial crises 
for the global South, where countries had bought into, or been forced into, financial 
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liberalisation (e.g. Vernango 2007, Arestis and Glickman 2002). In response, central 
banks across the global South started building up large foreign exchange reserves 
(Paincera 2009, McKinley and Karwowski 2015). Thus, in a financialised international 
system, characterised by large volumes of international capital flows, poor countries 
hold rich-country sovereign debt. They are entangled in the deepening of sovereign 
debt markets pursued by rich governments, effectively subsidising the global North 
(Ocampo 2007, Paincera 2009).  
Gabor (2010a) shows that these central banks had in fact no other choice 
than building up large reserves given their dependence on foreign financial inflows to 
balance persistent trade deficits. The case of Central Eastern Europe, where 
Western European banks have increasingly entered the market since the 1990s, is 
illustrative. Domestic banks there adjusted their practices to a market-based banking 
model (Hardie, Howarth, Maxfield and Verdun 2013) based on short-termism rather 
than patient capital (Gabor 2010a). Commercial banks borrow abroad in the 
anticipation of domestic sterilisation operations of the central bank, which allow them 
to purchase high-yielding domestic government bonds. Sterilisation operations are 
motivated by monetarist claims about the inflationary impact of foreign inflows, 
leading the central bank to aim to absorb perceived excess liquidity in the domestic 
market (Gabor 2010a, 2010b). However, they constitute an opportunity for financial 
investors to profit from carry trade, e.g. borrowing cheaply in Euro while investing in 
domestically-denominated sovereign debt with a higher yield. In the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis the Romanian Central Bank attempted to break this cycle by 
only sporadically undertaking sterilisation operations. In consequence foreign inflows 
dried up, forcing the country into the IMF’s lending facility (Gabor 2010b). Hence, 
Gabor (2010a: 256) argues that central banks in the global South play a direct role in 
the “financialization of money markets by offering high yields on sterilization 
instruments”.   
In rich countries the securitisation of assets, mainly consumer loans, has 
increased markedly since the early 2000s. In the US, where this phenomenon was 
most pronounced, the then head of the Federal Reserve lauded securitisation of 
mortgages, consumption credit and car loans as ‘constructive innovation’ allowing 
households with limited means to take part in their purchase (Greenspan 2004). 
These securities got closely entangled with banks’ liquidity management, as 
regulation incentivised US financial institutions to maintain precautionary liquidity 
(Knafo 2009). This meant that banks and financial firms used asset-backed securities 
(ABS) in short-term borrowing operations (i.e. repo agreements), where cash was 
swapped against securitised collateral with the understanding that the ABS would be 
repurchased when the repo matured (Gabor and Ban 2015). The US Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England used repos and the market practices that came 
with them (e.g. mark to market accounting and margin calls) in their lending 
operations to commercial banks (Whelan 2014). After the burst of the dot-com 
bubble repo markets expanded significantly in the US in response to loose monetary 
policy (Gorton and Metrick 2009), fuelling ‘securitised banking’ (Gorton 2009). This 
type of banking is characterised by short-termism rather than patient capital and 
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therefore a facet of financialisation (Gabor 2010a). Once again, financial regulation 
encouraged financialisation in the US. 
 
Monetary policy since the financial crisis 
‘Securitised banking’ has nowhere been as strongly encouraged by policy makers as 
in the Eurozone (Gabor and Ban 2015, Hübner 2016). This goes back to the early 
2000s, but was most visible in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Historically, the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) together have been 
important drivers behind financial deregulation in the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), often pushing for an emulation of US financial practices without much 
concern for financial stability (Grahl 2011). The financialisation of monetary policy, 
i.e. a push for ‘market-based’ or ‘securitised banking’, was pursued with the intension 
to bring about integration across the Eurozone (Hübner 2016). The European 
Commission’s 2002 Financial Collateral Directive, which instructed Eurozone 
members to remove all restrictions to the cross-border use of repos, was 
instrumental. Within the Eurozone repo trades are mostly carried out using sovereign 
bonds as collateral (Gabor and Ban 2015). The ECB and European Commission 
favoured an environment in which yields on Eurozone public debt converged and 
sovereign bonds, regardless from which Eurozone member, could be used 
interchangeably. Influenced by the collateral practice of the ECB (Gabor and Ban 
2016), which treated all Eurozone sovereign debt equally, this situation was achieved 
by 2008 (BIS 2011, Hördahl and King 2008). The financial crisis fragmented this 
Europeanised repo market again, sparking concerns about the interchangeability of 
Eurozone public debt. During this time of financial turmoil the ECB arguably behaved 
like a private investor in the repo markets, focusing on securing adequately-priced 
collateral, rather than ensuring financial stability in its role as lender of last resort 
(Gabor and Ban 2016). This is exemplified in the ECB’s embrace of private-sector 
practices such as mark to market accounting and the adoption of haircuts. In 2011, 
the ECB undermined the position of the European ‘periphery’ governments by 
implementing increased haircuts on their debt in repo dealings. Such actions can 
induce pro-cyclical effects since the response of other market participants will be to 
sell off the affected sovereign debt, adversely impacting its value. Thus, the ECB’s 
mimicking of financialised practices used by private sector participants directly 
undermined its duties as monetary policy maker.  
Repo markets in the Eurozone are considerably smaller than in the US. By 
2013, the ECB and European Commission were once again pushing actively for their 
deepening (Hübner 2016). This was underscored by the European Commission’s 
delegated acts ‘Solvency II’, which sought to lower capital requirements for 
securitised investment products, and ‘Liquidity Coverage Ratio’, which classified ABS 
as highly liquid assets. More regulation to support securitisation was brought on the 
way in 2015, and was under discussion by the European Parliament in 2016 (Hübner 
2016). Thus, it seems that the ECB has returned to its role as sovereign integrating 
European financial markets. Given the large volume of ABS collateral on its balance 
sheet, a legacy of liquidity provision to Eurozone banks during the recent financial 
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and sovereign debt crises, it is however also in its interest as financial (and 
financialised) investor to recreate liquid markets for securitised products. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper shows that the financialisation of the state, i.e. the changed relationship 
between the state and financial markets that can diminish the sovereign’s duties and 
accountability towards its citizens, is well-advanced across many rich and poor 
countries. Given the potential negative consequences of state financialisation on 
growth, equality and democratic accountability within societies and across the globe, 
it is worth considering how action towards de-financialisation could be taken. For this 
purpose we briefly turn to two empirical examples of de-financialisation.  
Regarding social provision, regulatory change in higher education has the 
potential to bring about de-financialisation. For-profit, and particularly stock 
exchange-listed, universities in the US experienced a decline in their total profits in 
2011 after the Obama administration restricted rules on their recruitment of students 
receiving federal funding (Eaton et al. 2016). Here the resistance of the financialised 
citizens played an important role and promises some potential for exercising 
pressure by voters. Student protests against rising tuition fees and privatisation in the 
US (McClanahan 2011a, 2011b), but also in Europe (Engelen 2015), are signs that 
students understand the increasing ‘financial control’ (Adamson 2009) to which they 
are subject and oppose it.  
Another example of de-financialised practices is the reintroduction of the 
syndication method among small Eurozone countries for placing sovereign bonds in 
the late 1990s and by Germany, France and Italy in the early 2000s (Preunkert 
2017). Refocusing on long-term relationships with trusted financial investors was a 
means of reducing risks and gaining support from private investors in the face of 
increased uncertainty expected from the introduction of the common currency. So 
de-financialisation of public policies and institutions is possible, perhaps especially so 
when backed by democratic pressure. 
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